Price discount of seasoned equity offers (SEOs) reflects an implicit cost for firms when raising additional equity capital. We examine whether stock liquidity and investor sentiment have interactive effect on SEO price discounts in Australia. Our results show that, in periods of deteriorating investor sentiment, the increase in SEO price discounts for firms with illiquid stocks is larger than the corresponding increase for firms with liquid stocks. This suggests that investors dislike illiquidity even more as their sentiment wanes, and they require greater compensation -deeper price discounts -when subscribing to SEOs by illiquid firms.
Liquidity, investor sentiment, and the price discount of SEOs in

Australia
I. Introduction
The ability for firms to raise capital in a cost-effective manner is critical for firm growth and the ongoing stability of financial markets. Investors require compensation for bearing the costs of illiquidity of their investments in equity (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) .
Accordingly, firms need to be conscious of their stocks' existing liquidity and its influence on the cost of raising capital which, in turn, affects their operational stability and investment opportunities. In the wake of the upheavals in financial markets following the 2007-08 global financial crisis, liquidity (or, the lack of it) has garnered increased significance to market participants. As investor confidence (i.e. sentiment) declined, it became increasingly difficult for firms to attract equity investors and this increased the cost of raising capital. 4 However, it is unclear whether the decline in investor sentiment affects the cost of raising equity capital equally for firms with liquid stocks versus those with illiquid stocks. We study this important issue and find that, when investor sentiment deteriorates, the cost of raising equity capital increases more for illiquid firms than for liquid firms.
It is well documented that firms incur an implicit cost, the price discount, when raising capital through seasoned equity offers (SEOs). Measured as the relative difference between the 4 This was acutely conspicuous in equity markets where, in the eight months to 31 st August 2008, total global equity issuance declined by almost 20% to US$684.6 billion compared to the corresponding period in the previous year (Dealogic estimate). In Australia, the effect of the global downturn was even more pronounced, with total equity issuance down almost 50% to A$31.6 billion for the eight months to 31 st August 2008 (Australian Stock Exchange data).
offer price and the last close price before the offer announcement, the SEO price discount is found to be around 3% (Mola and Loughran, 2004) for US public offerings, 17% for insured rights issues in Britain (Slovin et al., 2000) , and 19% for Australian rights issues (Owen and Suchard, 2008) . Existing literature identifies several reasons, including stock illiquidity and investor sentiment, for the existence of SEO price discount. 5 Beginning with Amihud and Mendelson (1986) , research in microstructure points to illiquidity as an important factor in equity pricing. A key implication of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) is that SEO price discount should be larger for firms with illiquid stocks since it is more costly and harder to subsequently sell these stocks than liquid stocks. Using the bid-ask spread as a liquidity proxy, Corwin (2003) and Butler et al. (2005) report that, in the United States, costs of raising seasoned equity capital are indeed higher for stocks with greater illiquidity.
A separate line of research suggests that asset pricing is influenced by investor psychology and behavioural biases (i.e. investor sentiment). In particular, these models suggest that SEO price discounts tend to be low when investor sentiment is high (the so called "hot" markets). As a result, firms can rationally time their capital raising activities in order to take advantage of higher investor sentiment to achieve better issue prices during "hot" markets (e.g. Ljungqvist, et al., 2006) . 6 Many empirical studies along this line focus on long-run performance metrics, and argue that the negative abnormal returns of SEO firms in the long-run indicate overpricing of SEOs at issuance (e.g. Loughran and Ritter, 1997) . Consistent with the 5
Other reasons include uncertainty and information asymmetry (e.g. Myers and Majluf, 1985; Rock, 1986) , price pressure (e.g. Scholes, 1972) , pre-offer price moves and manipulative trading (e.g. Gerard and Nanda, 1993) and underwriter pricing practices (e.g. Lee et al., 1996) . behavioural argument, Chiu (2006) reports a positive relation between investor sentiment and the number of SEOs.
Given that equity pricing is affected by stock liquidity and investor sentiment, it is surprising that there has been relatively little research on how the interaction of these two factors influences the SEO price discount. That is, does a decline in investor sentiment lead to greater SEO price discounts for illiquid stocks than for liquid stocks? This is important because, as investor sentiment wanes, investors might become increasingly sensitive and unwilling to bear the costs of holding illiquid assets which, in turn, would affect stocks with different liquidity profiles differently. As such, one would expect that a decline in investor sentiment will increase the SEO price discount of firms with illiquid stocks more than those with liquid stocks.
We address this important topic using data from the Australia Stock Exchange (ASX) over the period of January 2002 to December 2008. We document three main findings. First, firms with illiquid stocks discount their SEOs to a greater extent than do firms with liquid stocks. This is consistent with evidence from the United States and with the argument that investors require compensation for bearing the costs of illiquidity. Second, SEO price discounts are on average smaller in periods of enhanced investor sentiment. This lends support to the behavioural notion that SEO issues can achieve better pricing when investors are optimistic. Third, and more importantly, in periods of reduced investor sentiment, the increase in SEO price discounts for firms with illiquid stocks is larger than the corresponding increase for firms with liquid stocks. This is our main result, and it suggests that investors become increasingly concerned about illiquidity as their sentiment declines, leading to greater required compensation for illiquidity during such times. These results are robust to firm-level risk and uncertainty.
The contribution of this study is two-fold. First, our finding that the increase in SEO price discounts is higher for firms with illiquid stocks than those with liquid stocks in periods of reduced investor sentiment is new. Prior studies examine the relations between investor sentiment and SEO price discount and between stock liquidity and SEO price discount separately. Second, as part of this study, we develop a composite index of investor sentiment, similar in spirit to that of Baker and Wurgler (2006) . To our knowledge, such a measure of investor sentiment is currently not available for the Australian market. Ultimately, the implications of this study should assist firms in considering capital raising options, investors in making portfolio investment decisions, and investment banks in setting offer prices on equity issues.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section II reviews related literature and develops three testable hypotheses. Section III describes our sample, defines key variables and outlines the empirical methodology. The construction of Australian composite index of investor sentiment is also presented in this section. In Section IV, we discuss the main findings and perform robustness checks. Section V summarizes the conclusions.
II. Related literature and testable hypotheses
Occurrences of discounting seasoned equity offers (SEOs) have been documented, primarily in the United States. In one of the earliest studies, Smith (1977) documents an average discount of 0.54% for 328 American firms. In a subsequent study, Smith (1986) investigates differences in offer pricing across different industries, and documents an average price discount of 3.14% for industrials and a 0.75% price premium for utilities. Mola and Loughran (2004) analyse 4,814 U.S. SEOs from 1986-1999 and find an average price discount of 3.0%. They further observe that the mean SEO price discount has risen over time. Outside the U.S., studies on SEO price discount have been much more limited. Slovin et al. (2000) 1995-2005. 7 Existing literature offers several theories for the existence of discounts on pricing equity issues. In traditional corporate finance, theoretical models such as Myers and Majluf (1985) and Rock (1986) point out that firms' cost of raising capital is directly related to the uncertainty and information asymmetry perceived by external investors. Equity financing needs to be priced at a discount to compensate for such uncertainty and information disadvantage that investors encounter. As a result, the higher such perceived risk is, the more costly it is for the firm to raise equity capital. Studies, such as AltInkIlIç and Hansen (2003) and Bowen et al. (2007) , provide empirical support that firm fundamental risk and information asymmetry are significantly related to SEO price discount.
In the realm of market microstructure, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) point out illiquid stocks are more costly to trade. Using portfolios sorted based on aid-ask spread, they discover a positive relationship between illiquidity and equity price discount. Subsequent research has shown that illiquidity results in both explicit and implicit costs for firms when raising additional 7
Both studies examine the determinants of SEO announcement returns, including the impact of offer price discount. Our study, on the other hand, focuses on how the interaction between stock liquidity and investor sentiment affects the SEO price discounts. In addition, our study covers both private placements and rights issues, while other Australian studies only examine rights issues.
capital. With regards to explicit costs of SEO offers, Butler et al. (2005) find that firms with better stock liquidity come to market faster and they pay significantly lower direct costs in the form of investment banking fees. The study concludes that firms have an incentive to promote better stock liquidity so as to improve their ability to raise seasoned capital.
With respect to implicit costs, Corwin (2003) argues that the time lag between an SEO offer announcement and the pricing and distribution of the offer gives rise to additional price uncertainty. By studying 4,454 offers in the U.S. over 1980 -1998 , Corwin (2003 finds that SEO price discount increases in the bid-ask spread. In the Australian market, Kalev et al. (2006) study 417 listed companies from July 1991 through June 2000 and find evidence that the level of aftermarket liquidity achieved immediately after an IPO persists in subsequent years. Moreover, a firm's existing stock liquidity is identified as a potentially important factor driving the price discount of its subsequent equity offers.
8
Research in behavioural finance posits that investors' psychological motivations and preferences creates anomalies that can be exploited by firms in trying to minimize the cost of raising equity capital. In particular, firms could rationally respond to investor sentiment by taking advantage of 'windows of opportunity' to achieve more favourable offer prices (Ljungqvist et al., 2006) . Several empirical studies on SEOs support this view, with most focusing on long-run performance of SEO issuers. For instance, Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) and Loughran and Ritter (1997) suggest that the observed long-run underperformance of firms that issued seasoned equity compared to non-issuing firms is due to selective timing of the market by issuers. Chiu (2006) uses fund flows of open-ended mutual funds as a proxy for 8 We thank Peter Pham for sharing their SEO data with us, and for his helpful comments throughout the writing of this paper.
investor sentiment, and reports a positive relation between the number of SEOs and the sentiment proxy.
9
Given the two separate empirical facts that stock liquidity affects SEO price discount and that investor sentiment also affects equity pricing, it is natural to expect a possible interaction effect. In particular, as investor sentiment deteriorates, investors might become increasingly reluctant to hold illiquid stocks and require even greater compensation for illiquidity. This suggests that changes in investor sentiment would influence SEO price discounts via two channels. First, a reduction in investor sentiment will increase the average SEO price discounts as firms have to offer larger discounts to attract investor participation. Second, a decline in investor sentiment would increase the compensation for illiquidity and this would increase SEO price discounts more for firms with illiquid stocks than those with liquid stocks. This indirect effect of reduced investor sentiment suggests that, in regimes of deteriorating investor sentiment, the increase in SEO price discounts for illiquid firms should be larger than the increase for liquid firms.
We consider a two dimensional stylized world where stocks are either liquid (liquid firms) or illiquid (illiquid firms) and investors are either optimistic (enhanced sentiment) or pessimistic (reduced sentiment). Liquid firms would issue seasoned equities at a relatively small and stable discount whilst illiquid firms would need to issue equities at a greater discount to attract investor participation. If investors are optimistic, they are more likely to subscribe to any SEOs that are available and, hence, the difference between the discounts on SEO by liquid and by illiquid firms will not be large. On the other hand, if investors are pessimistic, they will only 9 Using Baker and Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment index, Campbell et al. (2009) We use evidence from Australian to address these hypotheses. Australia serves as an interesting laboratory in analysing the determinants of SEO pricing, in that both private placements and rights offers are common methods of issuance, and that many Australian firmsin particular those in the resource sector -are small and illiquid. The impact of liquidity, or the lack of it, on offer price setting might thus take upon a greater significance.
III. Data, key variables and methodology
We analyse 2,406 Australian SEOs between 1 st January, 2002 and 31 st December, 2008. 10 The sample is identified using Securities Data Company's (SDC) Global New Issues database. 10 The length of the time series data is limited by data availability. Thomson DataStream does not provide closing bid and ask prices for Australian stocks prior to June 2001, and we require at least six months of bid and ask prices in order to construct relative bid-ask spread, a key liquidity measure used in this paper.
We started with a full sample of 6,822 Australian common stock offerings over the sample period, excluding initial public offerings. Additional data for each issuing firm is obtained from
Thomson DataStream. To be included in the final sample, an issue must: (1) originate in Australian and be listed on the ASX, (2) be an issue of primary shares, (3) either be at least $1 million in total or be at least 1% of the firm's market capitalisation immediately prior to the offer's announcement, (4) have at least six months prior trading price data available on Thomson
DataStream, (5) have financial information in Thomson DataStream for the financial year prior to the offer announcement, (6) have no other significant information releases during the 3-day window leading up to the announcement, and (7) be classified as either a private placement or rights issue by SDC. 11 After these screenings and winsorizing all variables for outliers at the 1% and 99% levels, we are left with 2,406 observations in our final sample. This comprises 1,873 private placements and 533 rights issues, representing 77.85% and 22.15% of the total sample, respectively. 1,982 offers were issued at discount and 424 offers were issued at premium or at par relative to close price prior to the SEO announcements, representing 82.38% and 17.62% of the total sample, respectively. Figure 1 shows the annual average price discounts and number of SEO offers. The differential discount between private placements and rights offers varies significantly, with rights issued, on average, at 18.15% discount and placements at 10.40% discount.
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A. Key Variables
SEO Price Discount
We focus on the implicit cost borne by firms when issuing seasoned equity capital. This cost is measured as the relative difference between the SEO offer price and the last close price on the day prior to the announcement of the issue. An offer is priced at a discount if the offer price is below the last close price and at a premium to it is above the last close price.
Existing Stock Liquidity
Liquidity is not observable or measurable but the literature offers several proxies, which can broadly be categorized as either order-based measures or trade-based measures. We used relative bid-ask spread (order-based) and the Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure (trade-based)
to proxy liquidity in this paper. 12 Similar to Butler et al. (2005) and Kalev et al. (2006) , both measures are calculated over a six-month trading period ending on the day prior to the announcement of the SEO offer.
Relative spread, designed to capture the transaction cost of trading, is calculated by scaling the difference between the closing ask price and bid price by the average closing ask price and bid price. Corwin (2003) use the bid-ask spread to proxy liquidity in studying SEO price discounts, and Goyenko et al. (2009) report that Amihud's illiquidity measure is the best price impact of trade metric among the several measures they studied. 13 Following Butler et al. (2005) and others, we filtered out bid-ask quotes in which the ask price is less than or equal to the bid price. Amihud's (2002) 
Regimes of Investor Sentiment
Our primary measure of investor sentiment is a composite index constructed in the spirit of Baker and Wurgler (2006) . They argue that a composite index of sentiment based on the common variation in several underlying variables is more appropriate than a singular measure.
Given the limited consensus on a suitable proxy for investor sentiment, such an index is able to combine the common characteristics of a number of variables for sentiment and has a further advantage of limiting the effects of extreme observations in any singular measure. We estimated a modified version of their model for Australia (the Australia Composite Index for Investor Sentiment) as follows:
where TURN is share index turnover, NUMIPOS is number of IPOs, IPORTNDAY is the average firstday returns on IPOs, EQUITYSHR is equity share in new issues, and DIVPREM is dividend premium. Baker and Wurgler (2006) , our equation excludes closed-end funds which are not available in Australia. Listed investment companies (LICs) are close substitutes, but their pricing is quite different from that of US closed-end funds, potentially due to favorable tax treatments for LICs investments in Australia. Over our sample period, majority LICs were priced at a premium rather than at a discount and, therefore, we did not include them.
basis, and the first principal component explains 40.42% of the total variance. To capture changes in investor sentiment, we first calculate the monthly percentage change, ΔCOMPINDEX, and obtain the average for these changes over the six-month period leading up to the SEO announcement. We set sentiment indicator to one if the six-month average change is negative (i.e. regime of reduced investor sentiment), and zero otherwise.
<< INSERT TABLE 1 HERE >>
As a second measure of investor sentiment, we consider the aggregate Australian share market performance. It is widely accepted in the literature that a factor driving stock market performance is investor irrationality. For example, Lee et al. (2002) demonstrate that excess stock market returns are positively correlated with shifts in sentiment. We estimate excess market return by the monthly returns on the S&P/ASX200 index minus the yield on the 10-year Australian Government bonds. For each SEO offer, we calculate the average excess return on the market over a six-month period leading up to the announcement. Like the composite sentiment index, we set investor sentiment indicator to one if the six-month average market excess return is negative, and zero otherwise.
Control Variables
We follow related studies in controlling for firm-level and offer-level variables. Firmlevel controls include firm size, total risk, price run-up prior to the issue, scale of offer price, growth opportunities, ownership concentration ratio, firm age, and industry classification. Firm size is defined as the natural log of the total market capitalisation on the day prior to the SEO 15 For robustness, we consider three alternative specifications of COMPINDEX, one that does not include the timing differences of underlying variables, a second with 12-month lags, and a third that is based on underlying variables orthogonal to macroeconomic condition that is similar to the orthogonal SENT in Baker and Wurgler (2006) . Our main results hold for these alternative specifications.
announcement. Total risk is measured as the standard deviation of the stock return for a one-year trading window ending on the day before the announcement. Prior studies such as Masulis and Korwar (1986) and have documented that firms tend to issue SEOs after strong share price runups. We measure price run-up as the cumulative return in the trading month immediately before the announcement. Offer price scale is measured as the natural log of the close price prior to announcement. Growth opportunity is measured by Tobin's Q, the ratio of the sum of the market capitalisation and book value of total liabilities to the book value of total assets. Firm age is measured as the natural log of the number of years from the date the firm first listed on the ASX to the day prior to the announcement. Because price discount reduces the value of existing shareholders' wealth, one would expect that firms with higher ownership concentration ratio are less likely to offer deep discounts (Balachandran et al., 2008 
B. Model Specification
To test (H1), that the SEO price discount is positively related to existing stock illiquidity, we estimate the following OLS regression: To test (H2), that the average discount on SEO issues is higher in regimes of reduced investor sentiment, we estimate the following OLS regression: To test (H3), the interactive impact of stock illiquidity and investor sentiment on SEO price discount, we estimate the following OLS regression: 
IV. Main findings
We divide our sample into two groups: SEO discounts and SEO premiums. This is because offers that involve price premiums might represent opportunistic actions by issuers in taking advantage of investors that have an underlying interest in the company (Kalev et al., 2006) . Investors without vested interests would not purchase offers priced at a premium to market as they can acquire shares on-market at a cheaper price. The drivers of premium offers are thus expected to be different from those of discount offers. Consequently, our main regression results are based only on the sub-sample of 1,982 SEO discounts. 19 We first conduct univariate t-tests to determine the average SEO price discount between offers issued by liquid firms and illiquid firms, and between regimes of enhanced investor sentiment and regimes of reduced sentiment. T-test results are summarized in Table 3 . In Panel A, the sample is segregated using the median value for each of the two liquidity measures. In Panel B, we separate the sample using each of the two indicator proxies of investor sentiment.
20
Consistent with our expectations, the average SEO price discount is greater for illiquid firms. The difference in mean discount is 5.13% (p-value 0.000) when liquidity is measured by the relative bid-ask spread, and 4.18% (p-value 0.009) when is measured by the Amihud's illiquidity. Also as expected, the average SEO price discount in periods of reduced investor sentiment is higher than the average discount in periods of investor optimism. The difference in mean discount is 1.03% (p-value 0.078) when sentiment indicator is determined using changes in investor sentiment index, and 2.06% (p-value 0.005) when the indicator is based on performance of S&P/ASX200 index.
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A. Liquidity and SEO Price Discount
Regression results for testing (H1) are presented in Table 4 . Models A-C present the results where relative bid-ask spread proxies liquidity. Model A includes all discounted SEO offers, Model B excludes mining and financial stocks, and Model C only considers rights to invest in premium issues, then they are arguably less concerned about the firm's stock liquidity or investor attitude on the market.
issues. 21 Models D-F have the same specifications as Models A-C, respectively, but Amihud's illiquidity replaces the relative bid-ask spread as the liquidity proxy. Heteroskedasticityconsistent p-values are reported in brackets below the regression coefficients.
In general, regression results with relative bid-ask spread are consistent with (H1), and those with Amihud's illiquidity are less conclusive. Specifically, the relative spread coefficient estimates are positive and significant for all three model specifications. For instance, the estimate from Model A is 0.341 with a p-value of 0.005. This implies that the implicit cost of raising seasoned equity capital -price discount of an SEO -is greater when the bid-ask spread is wider.
When Amihud's illiquidity proxies liquidity, the coefficient estimates are all positive but only marginally significant in Model E.
With respect to the firm-level control variables, the total risk coefficient estimates are positive and significant, and price run-up coefficient estimates are negative and marginally significant. The coefficient estimates for other firm-level controls mostly have the expected signs but are not. This suggests that these firm-level variables cannot explain the SEO price discounts in Australia. In regards to the offer-level controls, we find that rights issues require significantly greater discounts than private placements. These results are consistent with prior studies.
Contrary to Owen and Suchard (2008) , we find a positive and significant coefficient for the RENOUNCEABLE dummy. 22 The negative and significant coefficient on underwritten issues is consistent with our expectations and provides support for Booth and Smith (1986) 's certification 21 The exclusion of mining stocks is due to the consideration that majority of mining companies are no-liability companies, and they have a differing legal and risk structure. Several prior studies, such as Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Wu (2005) , exclude financial stocks because the raising of equity by financial firms is often nonvoluntary and required to meet regulatory capital requirements. The exclusion of placements allows us to compare our findings to other Australian studies that consider only rights issues.
22 This is consistent with the adverse selection theory. The renounceability of an issue increases the cost of a SEO by allowing existing shareholders to sell their rights to new shareholders; this results in a redistribution of wealth between old and new shareholders.
theory, whilst bookrunner quality does not seem to have any material impact. In terms of the intended use of SEO proceeds, debt reduction has a positive coefficient whilst investment has a negative coefficient. However, these two regression coefficients are not statistically significant.
Thus, it does not appear that SEO price discounts are affected by the stated purpose for which the equity capital is being raised.
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B. Investor Sentiment and SEO Price Discount
Regression results for testing (H2) are presented in Table 5 . and financial stocks, while Model F's results are likely due to the fact that right issues are often offered at steep discounts which are arguable not very sensitive to market movements. Our best specifications, Models B and E which exclude mining and financial stocks and include placements, deliver results that clearly support (H2). Our results therefore imply that in periods when investors are increasingly pessimistic, the implicit costs of raising additional equity capital -SEO price discounts -are larger. The coefficient estimates on the control variables are similar to those presented in Table 4 .
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C. Liquidity, Sentiment and SEO Price Discount
Regression results for (H3), the multiplicative impact of investor sentiment and illiquidity on SEO discount, are presented in Table 6 . In general, the coefficient estimates on the liquidity proxies and investor sentiment indicators are consistent with our previous results that SOE price discounts are higher for illiquid stocks than liquid stocks and are higher when investor sentiment is low than when it is high.
More importantly, the empirical findings in Panel A are consistent with our third hypothesis that the increase in SEO price discounts is higher for illiquid stocks than for liquid stocks when investor sentiment declines. In particular, the coefficient estimates on all the liquidity-sentiment interaction terms in the six specifications (Models A -F) are positive and significant. This suggest when investor sentiment wanes investor dislike illiquid stocks even more and this increases the required discount on SEO for illiquid firms more than for liquid firms.
While the results from Panel B show that the coefficient estimates on the interactive terms are positive, they are not statistically significant. This is probably reflects Baker and Wurgler's (2006) argument that changes in a single factor may not be able to mimic changes in investor sentiment. Thus, while market movements arguable track changes in investor sentiment, it does not appear that the tracking is sufficiently strong to capture the interactive effects of investor sentiment and stock liquidity on SEO price discounts. Our composite index, which is similar to Baker and Wurgler's, comprise a number of factors that track investor sentiment and is, therefore, likely to capture changes in investor sentiment better than a single factor such as market return. Thus, we conclude that our results collectively support the hypothesis that the increase in SEO price discount for illiquid firms is higher than the corresponding increase for liquid firms in periods of deteriorating investor sentiment.
We graphically illustrate our main results in Figure 2 with two lines (enhanced and reduced sentiment lines). From the figure, we see that when investors optimistic, they still require higher SEO price discounts for illiquid firms than the liquid firms (the enhanced sentiment line slopes upwards). When investors are pessimistic, they require higher SEO price discounts on all stocks, but the increase in price discounts is higher for the illiquid firms than the liquid firms, resulting in a steeper slope for the reduce sentiment line.
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D. Robustness Checks
Our main findings documented above are robust to various sample partitions, model specifications, and alternative control variables. We discuss some of these results, which are not tabulated but are available upon request. First, in examining the sample of SEO discounts only, one might also be concerned that sample selection bias has been introduced because of the lower bound of price discount, thus invalidating the OLS regression. Whilst the methodology we adopt is consistent with prior studies such as Corwin (2003) and Butler et al. (2005) , we also run truncated regressions, which are designed to account for sample selection bias. The findings are consistent with our main results, validating the OLS regression results discussed previously.
Second, to ensure that our results are robust to the investor sentiment proxies, we also consider alternative proxies, including the Westpac-Melbourne Business Confidence Index and Consumer Sentiment Index. 24 The results from these alternative proxies are qualitatively the same as, albeit weaker than, our tabulated results. We also test alternative control variables considered in prior studies. For instance, we use the natural log of operating revenue as a measure for firm size, market-to-book ratio as a measure of growth opportunities. We also include financial leverage and equity beta as additional explanatory variables. Finally, we exclude offer-year fixed effects or control variables that are statistically insignificant in the main results. In all these alternative specifications, our main findings still hold.
24 Both indices are available on the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) website. The monthly business confidence index is reasonably highly correlated with our monthly composite sentiment index COMPINDEX (ρ = 0.56), whilst monthly consumer confidence index is only marginally positively correlated with monthly COMPINDEX (ρ = 0.27).
V. Conclusion
Recent upheavals in financial markets remind us of the link between declining markets and the difficulties with raising capital. In particular, as investor pessimism increased and liquidity dried up, it became increasingly difficult to raise equity capital and as such firms have to offer larger SEO price discounts to attract investors. However, it is unclear whether the increase in SEO price discount in such times is similar for firms with liquid stocks and those with illiquid stocks. We investigate this vital question based on a sample 2,406 SEOs offered in Australia, where SEO price discounts averaged 12.12% from January 2002 through December
2008.
Existing literature has proposed several explanations for the observed SEO price discount. Corporate finance studies have shown evidence that risks arising from both uncertainty and information asymmetry are significant factors influencing SEO price discount. Market microstructure literature has identified liquidity (or, the lack of it) as an important pricing variable. Behavioural finance has argued that investors' preferences and biases affect asset valuation, and that firms rationally take advantage of 'windows of opportunity' that arise from investors' time-varying sentiment when they issue SEOs to achieve better pricing. This study combines these views. In particular, we examine how the interaction of firm's existing stock liquidity and investor sentiment affects the extent of SEO price discount, controlling for measures of uncertainty and risk.
We document three results. First, the results show that SEO price discounts are significantly larger for firms with illiquid stocks than those with liquid stocks. Second, SEO price discounts are higher in regimes of reduced investor sentiment than in regimes of enhanced sentiment. Third, and most importantly, the results also show that the difference in SEO price discounts between illiquid and liquid firms increases in regimes of reduced investor sentiment relative to regimes of enhanced investor sentiment. Intuitively, equity investors require compensation for bearing the costs of illiquidity. During times of deteriorating investor sentiment, investors appear to be increasingly cautious with investing in illiquid stocks than in liquid stocks. As a result, during these times, the increase in required SEO price discount is larger for firms with illiquid stock than those with liquid stocks. As such, existing studies that have investigated the SEO price discount singularly from either a microstructure or behavioural finance perspective may be inadequate in understanding the determinants of SEO price discounts.
FIGURE 1 NUMBER OF SEO OFFERS AND AVERAGE PRICE DISCOUNT, 2002-2008
The sample comprises 2,406 issues of seasoned equity from the period of January 2002 to December 2008 that meet the conditions specified in Section III. In this sample, there are 1,873 private placements and 533 rights issues. SEO price discount is measured as the relative difference between the offer price and the last close price on the day prior to the announcement of the issue. In our full sample, 1,982 offers were issued at discount to the prior close and 424 offers were issued at premium or equal to the prior close, representing 82.38% and 17.62% of the total sample size, respectively. The average SEO price discount is 12.12%.
TABLE 1 AUSTRALIAN COMPOSITE INDEX FOR INVESTOR SENTIMENT
This table summarises the statistics and correlations for 5 underlying variables used to construct a composite index of investor sentiment in Australia. The selected measures and methodology applied in constructing the composite index follow Baker and Wurgler (2006) and is calculated on a monthly basis. The first measure, TURN, is the natural log of one plus the moving average twelve-month turnover ratio. Raw turnover is defined as the ratio of the monthly trade volume to the average shares outstanding for firms comprising the S&P/ASX200 share index. Trade volume and shares outstanding are obtained from Thomson DataStream. Monthly index constituents are identified from the S&P website. The second measure, NUMIPOS, is the monthly number of initial public offerings. The third measure, IPORTNDAY, is the average monthly first-day returns of initial public offerings. In both measures, initial public offerings are identified using Securities Data Company's Global New Issues database. Price data is obtained from Thomson DataStream. The fourth measure, EQUITYSHR, is the ratio of gross monthly equity issuance divided by the sum of gross monthly equity issuance and debt issuance. The values of equity and debt issuance are obtained from Securities Data Company's Global New Issues database. The fifth measure, DIVPREM, is the month-end log ratio of the value-weighted average market-to-book ratios of dividend payers and non-dividend payers. Financial and market data for the dividend premium measure are obtained from Thomson DataStream. Turnover, number of IPOs and IPO average first-day return and the dividend premium are lagged twelve months relative to share of equity issuance in total debt and equity issues. The investor sentiment index, COMPINDEX, is the first principal component of these five underlying variables, and it explains 40.42% of total variation. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Descriptive Statistics of Underlying Variables
FIGURE 2 GRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF MAIN FINDINGS
This figure shows a simplified illustration of the main findings described in Section IV. Two implications are suggested by the results. Firstly, in periods of reduced investor sentiment, SEO price discount is on average higher for all firms. This is shown in the vertical upward shift in the line intercept for the reduced sentiment regime. Secondly, the results imply that the differential in the SEO price discount in periods of reduced investor sentiment and enhanced investor sentiment are bigger for firms with low liquidity. This is shown in the larger size of the arrow for high-illiquidity firms compared to the smaller arrow indicating the SEO price discount differential for low-illiquidity firms.
TABLE 2 AUSTRALIAN COMPOSITE INDEX FOR INVESTOR SENTIMENT
This table summarises the statistics and correlations for 5 underlying variables used to construct a composite index of investor sentiment in Australia. The selected measures and methodology applied in constructing the composite index follow Baker and Wurgler (2006) and is calculated on a monthly basis. The first measure, TURN, is the natural log of one plus the moving average twelve-month turnover ratio. Raw turnover is defined as the ratio of the monthly trade volume to the average shares outstanding for firms comprising the S&P/ASX200 share index. SPREAD is defined as the average difference between the closing ask and bid prices scaled by the average bid-ask price over a six-month period ending on the day prior to the announcement date. AMIHUD is defined as the absolute daily return divided by daily trading value over a six-month period ending on the day prior to the announcement date. In Panel B, investor sentiment is given by two proxies: ASXPERF, an indicator variable equal to one if the average change in the S&P/ASX200 share market index for the six-months prior to the offer month is negative, and zero otherwise; and SENTIMENT, an indicator variable equal to one if the change in a composite index (COMPINDEX) for the six-months prior to the offer month is negative, and zero otherwise. 
Variable Definition Source
IPORTNDAY
The average first-day return for initial public offers in a given month. The return is measured as the difference between the close price on the first day and the IPO issue price scaled by the IPO issue price.
SDC; DataStream
NUMIPOS
The number of newly listed firms that commence trading in a given month.
SDC; DataStream
TURN
The ratio of index daily traded volume to total shares outstanding DataStream; own calculations
LN(IPOYEAR)
The natural log of the number of years from the first list date of the firm on the Australian Securities Exchange to the date of the SEO announcement.
DataStream,; SDC; own calculations
LN(MKTVALUE)
The natural log of the market capitalisation of the issuing firm on the last trading day prior to announcement of the offer.
DataStream
LN(PRICE)
The natural log of the close price on the day prior to announcement of the offer.
DataStream
LN(REVENUE)
The natural log of the operating sales revenue of the issuing firm as at the last balance data prior to announcement of the offer.
DataStream
MKTBOOK
The market-to-book ratio of the issuing firm on the last trading day prior to announcement of the offer.
DataStream
OFFERSIZE
The relative offer size measured as the ratio of the dollar proceeds from the issue to the market capitalisation of the firm on the last trading day prior to announcement of the offer.
SDC; DataStream; own calculations OWNERSHIP Ownership concentration ratio, calculated as the aggregate equity ownership held by blockholders owning at least 5% of equity stake in the firm.
Worldscope RUNUP Price runup, calculated as the cumulative stock return over the 1-month period ending on the day immediately prior to the SEO announcement.
DataStream; own calculations RENOUNCEABLE An indicator variable equal to one if the offer is a renounceable rights issue, and zero otherwise.
SDC
RETURNVOL
The standard deviation in the daily closing stock price measured over a one-year period ending on the last trading day prior to the announcement of the offer.
DataStream
